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THE SIXTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT
DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION IS A
COMPELLING STATE INTEREST AND THAT
THE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL
IS NARROWLY TAILORED TO FURTHER
THAT INTEREST-
GR UTTER V. BOLLINGER
Ryan C. Idzior*
HE Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger' has set a
dangerous precedent for university admissions programs across
the country. In Grutter, the race-conscious admissions system
used by the University of Michigan Law School ("Law School") was chal-
lenged on equal protection grounds. 2 The court adhered to Justice Pow-
ell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke3 in
holding that the goal of enrolling a diverse student body4 is a compelling
state interest. However, the Grutter court misconstrued Powell's opinion
when it found that the Law School's admissions program was narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.5 The Law School's admissions system fo-
cuses largely on obtaining racial diversity while granting little considera-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, 2004, Southern Methodist University Dedman School
of Law; B.A. Economics, 2001, University of Michigan. The author wishes to thank his
parents, Ronald and Kathleen, for their support, and Thomas Ludwig for his suggestions.
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The Supreme Court, in
a 5-4 decision, struck down The University of California-Davis Medical School's admis-
sions system that specifically reserved sixteen seats for minority applicants. Four members
of the Court held that race could never be used in the admissions process. Four others
found that race could be used as a factor subject to intermediate scrutiny review. Justice
Powell determined that the Medical School's program was unconstitutional but agreed that
race could be a factor in admissions subject to strict scrutiny review. Id. at 290-91. Be-
cause Powell agreed with the majority holding on the narrowest grounds, he wrote the
opinion of the Court.
4. Justice Powell determined that diversity in higher education was a compelling state
interest as required under strict scrutiny. Id. at 311-15. None of the other Justices joined in
that part of his plurality opinion.
5. Justice Powell determined that quota-based affirmative action admissions policies
were unconstitutional but described certain methods that may be used to enroll a diverse
student body. See id. at 315-19.
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tion to other unique student characteristics. 6 Consequently, the Sixth
Circuit has endorsed an admissions program that violates students' equal
protection rights and impedes the realization of true diversity.
The Law School seeks to admit a mixed group of students from various
backgrounds that are among the most capable students applying to law
school in a given year.7 To achieve this objective, the Law School drafted
its official admissions policy to comply with Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke.8 The policy explains that the Law School uses race as a "plus" in
making its admissions decisions, but that it does not reserve a fixed num-
ber of seats for underrepresented minorities. 9 The Law School initially
evaluates a composite of the applicants' Law School Admission Test
("LSAT") scores and undergraduate grade-point average. 10 This com-
posite can be visualized as a grid with LSAT scores on the horizontal axis
and grade-point averages on the vertical axis, where higher combinations
of scores are located in the grid's upper right-hand corner. Next, "soft"
variables such as undergraduate institution, demonstrated leadership, and
work experience are taken into account." After these qualities are as-
sessed, some students with relatively low index scores may be admitted to
further the Law School's goal of enrolling a meaningful number or "criti-
cal mass" of underrepresented minority students. 12
In 2001, the court for the Eastern District of Michigan struck down the
Law School's admissions policy.' 3 The district court determined that the
equal protection rights of Barbara Grutter and other unsuccessful appli-
cants had been violated.' 4 The court was convinced that Justice Powell
spoke for himself in Bakke when he identified diversity as a compelling
state interest because no other justices joined that part of his opinion.' 5
The court further held that even if diversity was a compelling state inter-
est, the Law School's use of race was not narrowly tailored as required
under strict scrutiny.' 6 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit overruled the district
court's conclusions.' 7 In a 5-4 decision, the appellate court held that Pow-
ell's opinion did govern the issue and determined that the Law School's
admissions policy was narrowly tailored to achieve its enrollment
objectives.' 8
6. Powell believed that other elements of diversity, such as leadership ability, per-
sonal talents, and unique work experience, could also be useful in contributing to a diverse
learning environment. See id.
7. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 735-36.
8. Id. at 735.
9. Id. at 736.
10. Id.
H1. I.
12. Id. at 737.
13. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 874 (E.D. Mich. 2001), rev'd, 288 F.3d 732
(6th Cir. 2002).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 876.
16. Id. at 877.




In ruling that diversity is a compelling government interest, the Grutter
court followed the Ninth Circuit approach 19 by applying the Supreme
Court plurality test established in Marks v. United States:20 "When a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.121 The Grutter court concluded
that, because Justice Powell preferred a more strict level of scrutiny in
determining the constitutionality of admissions programs than did the
other four Justices, his opinion, including his view that diversity consti-
tuted a compelling interest, was the "narrowest grounds" on which the
Bakke judgment rested.22
In determining that the Law School's admissions program was nar-
rowly tailored, the Grutter court again relied on Powell's opinion in
Bakke.23 The court summarized his views on permissible admissions sys-
tems with two general guidelines: (1) segregated, dual-track admissions
systems utilizing quotas for under-represented minorities are unconstitu-
tional; and (2) admissions policies where race and ethnicity are consid-
ered a "plus" do not offend the Equal Protection Clause.24
According to the court, the Law School's admissions program complied
with the first guideline because it did not explicitly reserve a fixed num-
ber of seats for underrepresented minorities. 25 The court explained that
the admissions policy also conformed to the second guideline because the
Law School considered all factors of diversity (not just race) and allowed
all students to compete for every seat in each class. 26 Holding that diver-
sity in higher education is a compelling state interest and finding the ad-
missions policy to be narrowly tailored, the Grutter court upheld the
constitutionality of the Law School's admissions system.
Although the Grutter court's determination that diversity in higher ed-
ucation is a compelling state interest agrees with the rationale used in
Smith, the issue is far from settled. In Hopwood v. Texas,27 the Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled that the test utilized in Marks did not apply to Powell's opinion
in Bakke28 and held that diversity in higher education was not a compel-
19. Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000). In determining
the constitutionality of The University of Washington Law School's affirmative action ad-
missions process, the Smith court found that Powell's opinion in Bakke was binding and
applied the Marks test to support its holding. Nevertheless, that court did not consider
whether the school's policy was narrowly tailored. A state law had already prohibited
racial classifications.
20. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
21. Id.
22. See Grutter, 288 F.3d at 741.
23. Id. at 744-47.
24. Id. at 745-46.
25. Id. at 746.
26. Id. at 746-47.
27. Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
28. The Hopwood court did not see Marks as an invitation for lower courts to read
fragmented opinions while attempting to ascertain how Justices "would have" held. Con-
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ling state interest.29 Recognizing the ambiguity surrounding the issue,
several appellate courts have chosen not to answer the question and have
left the matter for the Supreme Court.30 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has not affirmed or rejected Powell's views in the twenty-two years
following the Bakke decision.31
While the Grutter court's decision to comply with Powell's entire Bakke
opinion is debatable, its determination that the Law School's admissions
policy was narrowly tailored is clearly mistaken. The Grutter dissent criti-
cized the decision with four main points: (1) the magnitude of the school's
racial preference is too large to be considered constitutional, (2) the "crit-
ical mass" of minority students the Law School strives to admit is almost
indistinguishable from a racial quota, (3) the benefits of diversity are
highly questionable, and (4) the failure of the Law School to consider
race-neutral means of achieving their goal. 32 However, the strongest ar-
guments against the majority's conclusions can be found within the words
of Powell's opinion in Bakke.
The Grutter court's approval of the Law School's use of race as a "plus"
is inconsistent with Powell's opinion. Powell wrote that when a large mid-
dle group of students are evaluated, "the race of an applicant may tip the
balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may
tip the balance in other candidates' cases."'33 The Law School's admis-
sions figures indicate that race alone is worth approximately an entire
grade-point in its criteria.34 For example, a black applicant with a "B"
grade-point average has the same chance for admission as a white appli-
cant with the same LSAT score and an "A" grade-point average. Simi-
larly, race is worth approximately eleven points, or a 20-percent boost on
the LSAT.35 The Law School is not simply using racial preferences as a
way to tip the balance in an applicant's favor as Powell intended. Recog-
nizing this disparity, the Grutter court explained that Powell's "tip the
balance" language was not meant as a limit on the amount of racial pref-
erence. 36 However, this reasoning is flawed because an unlimited amount
of preference toward minorities would inevitably insulate these appli-
cants from competition for available seats and violate equal protection. 37
sequently, the court read Bakke as neither requiring nor foreclosing the acceptance of
diversity as a compelling state interest. Id. at 275 n.66.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Brewer v. W. lrondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 747-49 (2d Cir.
2000); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123.130 (4th Cir. 1999); Wess-
mann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 795, 800 (1st Cir. 1998); Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of
Med., 159 F.3d 487, 499 (10th Cir. 1998); McNamara v. Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th
Cir. 1998).
31. Last year the Supreme Court granted cert in the Grutter case, Grutter v. Bollinger,
123 S. Ct. 617 (2002), indicating that the Court is ready to resolve this ambiguity.
32. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 796-808.
33. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316.
34. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 796.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 748-49.
37. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318. Powell thought that a "plus" system would be permis-
sible as long as race did not become the decisive factor in the decision process when com-
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Not only does the Law School give too much preference to race, it also
does not give fair consideration to other unique student attributes. Pow-
ell believed that diversity includes a broad array of characteristics that
should be weighed along with race.38 Admissions data for the Law
School's first-year class in 2000 is an example of the Law School's failure
to correctly interpret Powell's views.39 This data is illustrated in the grid
below. Applicants with composite grade-point average and LSAT scores
in the lower-left section of the admissions grid represent the students with
the lowest objective qualifications. Applicants with grade-point averages
ranging from 3.0 to 3.74 and LSAT scores from 148 to 154 represent a
square area in the lower-left corner of the grid. In 2000, twenty-eight
minority applicants were admitted with composite scores in this range.40
However, the Law School admitted no white applicants within this range,
despite receiving more applications from white students.41
2000-Final LSAT & GPA Admission Grid
Selected Minorities
(African Americans, Native Americans, Mexican Americans)
148-150 151-153 154-155 156-158 159-160 161-163 164-166 167-169 170-above Total
Apps Apps Apps Apps Apps Apps Apps Apps Apps Apps
Admits Admits Admits Admits Admits Admits Admits Admits Admits Admits
3.75 & I 2 2 3 3 8 2 2 I 30
above 0 I I 2 3 7 2 2 I 19
3.50- 5 12 3 12 4 8 7 -5 0 71
3.74 I 5 2 0 2 6 7 5 0 40
3.25- 10 15 5 14 I 6 7 4 3 91
3.49 2 6 1 4 1 10 5 3 7 1 4 3 44
3.00- 13 8 9 10 4 4 4 I 0 70
3.24 1 2 5 10 3 2 3 I 0 28
Caucasian Americans
3.75 & 8 21 23 37 40 107 138 85 92 561
above 0 2 I 2 3 31 95 85 91 31I
3.50- 10 22 28 59 42 135 164 102 76 650
3.74 0 0 0 0 3 17 90 99 74 284
3.25- 8 15 20 49 34 77 77 54 34 385
3.49 0 0 0 2 I 6 24 46 34 114
3.00- 11 5 10 21 14 43 31 23 24 189
3.24 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 21 34
If appropriate consideration were given to other factors of diversity, it
is reasonable to assume that at least a few white applicants would have
been admitted from this group. Instead, it appears that the Law School's
pared with other potentially beneficial student attributes. Id. at 317. In his vision of a
permissible system, an "applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candi-
date receiving a (plus) on the basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed
from all consideration . . . simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong
surname." Id. at 318.
38. Id. at 315.




notion of diversity is only skin-deep. When addressing this issue, the
Grutter court ignored the Law School's admissions figures. The court re-
lied on testimony from the Law School staff and the text of the admis-
sions policy to conclude that all elements of diversity were weighed
fairly.42
The strong racial preference and exclusion of non-minorities from the
last seats in each class has resulted in the functional equivalent of a quota
system. This conclusion is strongly supported by the Law School's steady
minority enrollment percentage. From 1995 to 1998, minority enrollment
ranged from 13.5 to 13.7 percent of the class enrolled. 43 The Grutter
court noted that in other years, minority enrollment deviated from this
range. 44 Nevertheless, these staggering figures demonstrate how the
"plus" system allows the Law School to admit a desired percentage of
minorities each year.
The Law School's official admissions policy closely tracks Powell's
views but the policy is vaguely construed when admissions decisions are
ultimately made. As drafted, there is nothing in the Law School's admis-
sions policy that contradicts Powell's views. On the other hand, there is
nothing written in the policy that places a ceiling on the amount of a
"plus" that may be used or a floor on the weight that must be given to
other diverse student attributes. Powell believed that a "plus" system
could be constitutional as long as elements of diversity other than race
were considered. However, it would be ridiculous to assume that Powell
believed that a university could give a virtually unlimited preference to
minorities as long as some minute amount of consideration were given to
other characteristics. Nevertheless, the Law School has been able to op-
erate a race-balancing admissions system under the cover of Powell's
guidelines.
The Grutter court correctly argued that, under Bakke, "a court would
not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially nondiscrimi-
natory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional
equivalent of a quota system."'45 However, under Bakke, good faith is
only presumed in absence of a showing to the contrary. 46 The admissions
data show that the Law School gave virtually unlimited preference to mi-
norities in order to reserve the last seats in each class, thus making sure
that a certain percentage are enrolled. Consequently, the overwhelming
evidence confirms that good faith cannot be presumed in this case. The
Grutter court's determination that the Law School's admissions system is
permissible under Bakke is erroneous.
The Grutter court's holding is particularly significant because the circuit
courts remain in dispute over the pursuit of diversity as a compelling state
42. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 771.
43. Id. at 801.
44. Id. at 748.
45. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
46. Id. at 318-19.
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interest in higher education. Although the Marks test has been applied to
Bakke in previous decisions, the Grutter court's holding marks the first
time that a race-conscious admissions program modeled after Bakke has
been deemed narrowly tailored at the appellate court level. Accordingly,
in December of 2002, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Grutter.47
The Supreme Court will finally decide whether diversity is a compelling
state interest. If it is determined that the pursuit of diversity is compel-
ling, the Court will also be given the opportunity to define specific guide-
lines for constitutionally permissible race-conscious admissions systems.
In the absence of Supreme Court clarification, The University of Michi-
gan Law School's race-balancing admission system looms as the only
model for the nation's institutions of higher learning to follow.
47. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002). Along with Grutter, the Supreme Court
will review Gratz v. Bollinger, a similar case that involves The University of Michigan's
undergraduate admissions system even though the appellate court has yet to rule on the
case. See William Mears, Affirmative Action Case Awaits Supreme Court Review, CNN.
com, Dec. 3, 2002, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/02/scotus.affirmative.action (last
visited Feb. 5, 2003).
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